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Abstract
Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a governments decision
between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question
using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses
distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We
show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior
bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However,
as senior tranches become su¢ ciently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into
a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one.
We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can
eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which
the government defaults also on senior debt.
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1 Introduction
Tranching of public debt features prominently in recent debates on the European sovereign
debt crisis, with particular attention devoted to proposals for jointly issued "Eurobonds",
that would be senior relative to national sovereign debt (see e.g. Brunnermeier et al., 2016;
Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010; European Commission, 2011).1 More generally, govern-
ments in countries with weak economic and scal fundamentals often pursue tranching by
granting seniority to o¢ cial creditors or issuing a portion of their bonds under foreign juris-
diction. In such cases, seniority is often associated not only with priority in the repayment
order, but with a stronger commitment to repayment.2
While tranching and seniority are typically discussed in relation to the need to create
a safe asset in economies with risky debt, they also raise a number of important ques-
tions concerning scal policy and debt sustainability. First and foremost, can issuing senior
and junior debt a¤ect prospective (state-contingent) primary decits, by strengthening the
government incentive to raise revenue through distortionary instruments, as opposed to un-
dergoing costly default? The question is whether the revenue that the government generates
to service its debt is independent of the seniority structure of public debt, that is, whether
this form of nancial engineeringis neutral with respect to overall debt sustainability.
Second, if the seniority structure of government debt is not neutral for scal policy, can
a government rely on it to contain vulnerability to self-fullling debt crises? In other words,
can managing the seniority structure be seen as an instrument to shield sovereign debt from
arbitrary, highly destabilizing, market dynamics  without any need for the central bank
to provide a monetary backstop to government debt, or for an external lender of last resort?
In this paper, we build a stylized framework to address these questions. In the model,
default is costly and a discretionary government trades o¤ distortionary taxation against
an optimal haircut to bondholders. Our key result is that the e¤ect of tranching, when
associated with plausible, marginally higher default costs on senior bonds, is highly non-
linear in the size of the senior tranche. We show that the seniority structure is irrelevant
1We use the term Eurobonds to refer to (proposed) government bonds issued jointly by member states
of the euro area.
2Defaulting on sovereign bonds issued under foreign law may result in more severe penalties compared
to defaulting on their counterparts under domestic law. Similarly, defaulting on o¢ cial creditors could be
more costly than defaulting on private creditors.
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(but for the relative price of bonds) when the senior tranche is either small or very large.
In these cases, a version of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds: issuing more or
less senior debt at the margin does not a¤ect state-contingent primary surpluses, but only
the distribution of cash ows across bond types. However, intermediate levels of tranching
may reduce the cost of nancing and increase the incentive for the government to service
not only senior, but also junior tranches. A key implication is that seniority can prevent
sovereign default, addressing the instability created by self-fullling debt crises.
We provide analytical and economic insights on this result using a bare-bones model of
debt crises. Households are risk neutral and may invest their endowment either in a safe
asset or (risky) sovereign bonds. The government is benevolent in that it seeks to maximize
household welfare, but discretionary in that it may not pre-commit to repaying its debt. To
meet its nancing needs, the government sells sovereign bonds at a market price. When debt
repayments come due, the government optimally chooses the level of taxation, whether to
default on its debt, and if it chooses to default, the extent of the haircut. In the model,
household expectations about sovereign default a¤ect the governments borrowing costs and
incentives to default, raising the possibility of multiple equilibria. In a bad equilibrium,
high sovereign yields in anticipation of default risk raise the amount of distortionary taxa-
tion required to repay debt, therefore making default preferable. Vulnerability to this bad
equilibrium hinges on the initial nancing need of the government.
Our main results are as follows. First, we characterize a threshold below which issuing
senior bonds simply leads the government to increase the haircut on junior bondholders
in order to repay the senior tranche. Tranching is neutral for everything but the relative
price of (or interest rates on) senior and junior debt taxes, default incentives (on the junior
tranche) and the overall cost of borrowing for the government remain unchanged. Tranching
simply redistributes a given cash ow among holders of di¤erent types of debt. Once the
senior tranche size exceeds this threshold, however, default on the junior tranche in some
state realizations may be complete.
Our second result concerns equilibria conditional on senior debt being large enough that
the default on junior bonds is 100 percent  so that there are no residual cash ows to
redistribute from junior to senior bondholders: the government may only avoid default on
senior bonds by raising tax revenues. We show that if, plausibly, there is a default cost
di¤erential, the extra costs associated with reneging on senior liabilities create a discontinuity
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in the governments optimal scal policy. Depending on the cost di¤erential, the government
may choose to increase revenues, rather than defaulting on senior bonds.3
We show that this discontinuity has far reaching consequences on debt pricing and sus-
tainability. Namely, to the extent that higher total payments to bondholders reduce ex-ante
borrowing costs, a higher valuation of sovereign bonds at issuance reduces the incentive for
the government to default on all, junior and senior, bonds. A key result from our analy-
sis is that, potentially, this e¤ect may eliminate bad equilibria with self-fullling default
altogether. Depending on the cost of default on senior bonds, however, raising the senior
tranche size to very high levels eventually makes default attractive again. Our nal result is
that there is a upper threshold above which senior debt issuance causes the government to
default on both junior and senior debt  reinstating the validity of the Modigliani-Miller
ine¤ectiveness result proven for low levels of tranching.
Our paper relates to a large literature on debt crises which includes Cole and Kehoe
(2000), Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), and Nicolini et al. (2015) among many others. We
build upon the framework in Calvo (1988). While we introduce xed costs of default as in
Corsetti and Dedola (2016), our focus is on tranching instead of monetary backstops. Similar
to Hatchondo et al. (2017), we nd that tranching may reduce the governments borrowing
costs. However, our framework di¤ers from this literature in two fundamental ways. First,
we allow for default on the senior tranche, which e¤ectively places an upper bound on the
senior tranche size. Second, since the government optimally determines the haircut, we
account for the possibility that tranching may reduce payments to junior bondholders.
Our paper is also closely related to the recent literature on Eurobonds.4 Delpla and
von Weizsäcker (2010) propose the creation of a senior tranche of jointly issued sovereign
debt guaranteed by all euro area member states, while nationally issued debt becomes a
junior tranche. To preserve market discipline, their proposal restricts the amount of senior
bonds each country may issue. Muellbauer (2011) and German Council of Economic Experts
(2012) argue that joint liability should be combined with conditionalities to prevent moral
hazard while Philippon and Hellwig (2011) suggest restricting Eurobonds to only short term
maturities.
3It is worth re-iterating that if the costs of default are the same for junior and senior debt, the seniority
structure would still be irrelevant: the government would start imposing a haircut on the holders of senior
bonds.
4See Eij¢ nger (2011) for a summary of the earlier proposals.
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In these studies, the main benet of Eurobonds is to pool risk and prevent liquidity runs
on individual countries through mutualization, while tranching serves to alleviate moral
hazard. In a di¤erent vein, Beck et al. (2011) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016, 2017) analyze
Eurobonds without joint guarantees. Rather than risk sharing, these studies focus on the
benets of providing a safe asset for banks in default-risky countries through a combination
of diversication and tranching.
We contribute to this literature by bringing to attention an additional reason for tranch-
ing: costly default. In our framework, there is neither scope for risk pooling, nor any demand
for safe assets, that is, the irrelevance results from Modigliani and Miller (1958) hold in the
absence of costly default. We show that introducing di¤erential default costs into this frame-
work creates a non-linear relationship between tranching and government incentives to tax
and default, potentially eliminating default risk from not only the senior tranches but also
the junior.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 describes a bare-bones model of self-fullling debt crises.
Section 3 introduces tranching. Section 4 considers default on senior debt. Section 5 provides
a numerical illustration. Section 6 concludes.
2 A bare-bones model of sovereign debt crises
Consider a two-period endowment economy populated by a unit continuum of identical risk-
neutral households which derive utility from consuming in period 2 only. In the rst period,
households are endowed with a stock of nancial wealth W0 which they can invest in two
assets: public debt B issued at an endogenous market price qb and a safe asset K sold at
exogenously given price q with an innitely elastic supply.5 Householdsperiod 1 budget
constraint can then be written as
W0 = qbB + qK
In period 2, households receive a random output realization: it may be highYH and low
YL with probabilities (1  ) and  respectively. Households also receive payo¤s from their
assets, pay taxes, and consume, leading to the set of budget constraints
5In the interest of tractability, we model B; K as discount bonds
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Ci = Yi   zi (Ti)  Ti +K + (1  i)B   i 8 i 2 fL;Hg (1)
where i 2 fL;Hg indexes the state of nature, Ci is consumption, Ti is the tax bill and zi (Ti)
captures dead-weight losses associated with tax distortions. i 2 [0; 1] represents a potential
haircut on public debt which leads to a xed default cost on the economy
i =
(
 if i > 0
0 otherwise
In line with the literature on tax smoothing, we posit that zi (:) is strictly convex and
that at a given level of tax revenues, dead-weight losses are larger and grow faster in taxation
in the state with lower output, that is
zL (:) > zH (:) (2)
z0L (:) > z
0
H (:) (3)
The government is benevolent - it seeks to maximize the utility of the representative
household - but lacks the ability to commit ex-ante to a tax schedule. In period 1, the
government rolls over its (exogenous) nancing needB0 by issuing discount bondsB = B0=qb.
In period 2, the government observes the output realization and set tax and haircut rates
under discretion, consistent with its budget constraint
Ti  G = (1  i)B + iB (4)
where  2 (0; 1) represents a budgetary cost of default proportional to defaulted payments
and G is public spending. Since what matters in our analysis is the size of the primary
surplus rather than individual budget components, we posit without loss of generality that
G is a parameter invariant across states of nature.
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2.1 Optimal default and taxation plans under discretion
The governments optimization problem can be written as
max
Ti>0;i2[0;1]
Yi   zi (Ti)  i   Ti +K + (1  i)B
subject to (4). Due to the boundary constraints on the haircut, there are two corner solutions,
respectively with no default (i = 0) and complete default (i = 1), as well as an interior
solution i = ^i 2 (0; 1). We nd it convenient to begin with a description of the interior
solution, where tax revenues are pinned down by a rst order condition
z0i

T^i

=

1   (5)
that trades-o¤ marginal tax distortions against (fractional) budgetary default costs. Com-
bining (4) and (5) yields an expression for the (interior) haircut
^i =
1
1  
 
1  T^i  G
B
!
(6)
These expressions indicate that, in an interior solution, tax revenues are not a¤ected by a rise
in the public debt bill B: Rather, additional debt simply increases the size of the haircut. In
contrast, in states with lower (marginal) tax distortions as per (3), the government optimally
collects more tax revenues and reduces the haircut. In other words, the government uses the
haircut to smooth tax distortions across states of nature.
The xed costs  associated with default create a discontinuity in the governments prob-
lem such that default is optimal only when it increases household welfare (i.e. consumption).
This leads to the default condition
zi (G+B) > zi (Ti) +  + iB (7)
When considering an interior solution, the default condition can be written in terms of a
minimum haircuti, dened implicitly by the expression
zi

T^i

+  = zi

T^i +
i (1  a)
1  i (1  a)

T^i  G

  ai
1  i (1  a)

T^i  G

(8)
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such that the interior solution is optimal for ^i  i. Observe that i is increasing in the
xed default cost  but independent of B. Moreover, the minimum haircut is higher in
states with less tax distortions, that is L < H .
For ^i < i, optimal policy is characterized by a no-default corner outcome i = 0 with
a tax bill
Ti = G+B
that is consistent with complete repayment of debt.
Finally, the corner solution with complete default may be optimal when ^i > 1. In this
case, the relevant default condition is given by combining (7) with i = 1 such that
zi (G+B) > zi (G+ B) +  + B (9)
and taxes are set at
Ti = G+ B
Observe that in the corner solutions tax revenues become contingent on the debt bill
B instead of tax distortions: facing constraints on its ability to adjust the haircut, the
government sets taxes according to its debt repayment plans rather than marginal distortions.
This also implies that tax revenues cease to be state-contingent.
To summarize, the governments optimal policy plan is written compactly in Table 1.
Table 1: Governments optimal discretionary plan
If ^i > 1, zi (G+B) > zi (G+ B) +  + B : i = 1 Ti = G+ B
If ^i 2 [i; 1] : i = ^i Ti = T^i = z0 1i
 

1 

Otherwise : i = 0 Ti = G+B
2.2 Debt pricing
The price of public debt is pinned down by an interest parity condition, which equates (under
risk neutrality) the expected returns on government bonds with those of safe assets
qb = q [(1  ) (1  H) +  (1  L)] (10)
8
Given the governments need to roll over its initial nancing need B0, any decline in the price
of its bonds qb due to expectations of default leads to a rise in market nancing B = D=qb,
raising the governments debt burden in period 2. We capture this in a market nancing
schedule
B =
B0
q [(1  ) (1  H) +  (1  L)] (11)
2.3 Rational expectations equilibrium and regularity conditions
Under rational expectations, households anticipate the optimal discretionary plan of the gov-
ernment conditional on its debt B. The market nancing schedule (11), together with the
government budget constraint (4), the expressions for interior and minimum haircuts respec-
tively given by (6) and (8), and the governments optimal discretionary plan as described in
Table 1 dene a rational expectations equilibrium.
To rule out equilibria on the right side of the debt-La¤er curves peak (i.e. where the
price of public debt qb is increasing in the governments nancing need B0), we impose the
following regularity restrictions
z0H

T^H

! 0
1   > 
which rule out default in the high output state (H = 0) in order to place a lower bound on
qb.
To keen our exposition as compact as possible, in the remainder of the paper we drop
the subscript L. Therefore, the market nancing schedule (11) becomes
B =
B0
q (1  ) (12)
where  refers to the haircut in state L.
2.4 Equilibria
As in our economy there may be two possible equilibrium types, one with and one without
default, we adopt the following notation. Variables in a no-default equilibrium will be written
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with a superscript NDE, whereas NDE = 0; the superscript DEwill be use for the
equilibrium with default, whereas the haircut DE > 0 will be strictly positive in state L:
Proposition 1 characterizes these equilibria and shows that they exist in regions of nancing
need B0 that line up monotonically, that is, as B0 rises, we move from a region of NDE to
DE. Most importantly, the proposition shows that, when there is a xed default cost  > 0,
these two regions overlap leading to multiple equilibria.
Proposition 1 Let
B0 
q

T^  G

1  (1  )  (13)
B0  (1  )
q

T^  G

1  (1  )  (14)
For B0 < B0, NDE is self-conrming such that
qNDEb = q
BNDE = B0=q
NDE = 0
TNDE = G+BNDE
and for B0  B0, DE is self-conrming and characterized by
DE = min
24 B0  

T^  G

q
(1  )B0   

T^  G

q
; 1
35
qDEb =
8<: q (1  ) if 
DE = 1
(1  )qB0
(1 )B0 q(T^ G) otherwise
BDE = B0=q
DE
b (15)
TDE =
(
G+ BDE if  = 1
T^ otherwise
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Finally, there are multiple equilibria when nancing needs are within the region
B0  B0 < B0
which is non-empty for  > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We provide intuition about the mechanism generating multiplicity with the use of a
graphical example in Figure 1. In doing so, we represent the model as a system of three
equations: (a) A minimum haircut  given by (8) which is increasing in the xed cost of
default  and independent of the governments period 2 debt burden B, (b) a non-linear
optimal haircut schedule  (B) described by (6) and Table 1, and (c) a market nancing
schedule B (; B0) given by (12).
The market nancing schedule is upward sloping as an increase in the anticipated haircut
on sovereign bonds reduces their market price qb, driving the government to issue more bonds
to meet its initial nancing need B0. The optimal haircut schedule is also upward sloping
in the interior region  2 (; 1) because the governments optimal policy plan prescribes
a constant primary surplus

T^  G

at a level pinned down by marginal distortions as
explained in Section 2.1.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium solutions at levels of nancing need B0 < B00 < B
00
0 
whereby a higher nancing need causes a shift to the right in the market nancing schedule.
Equilibrium occurs at the combinations of (B; ) where the market nancing and optimal
haircut schedules intersect. At B0, these schedules only intersect at (B; ) =

B0
q
; 0

such
that there is a unique no default equilibrium denoted as NDE. In this equilibrium, the
government has access to funds at the risk-free rate q 1. In contrast, there are multiple
equilibria at B00 with NDE
0 pointing at an equilibrium with no default and DE 0 at an
equilibrium with default in state L. The source of multiplicity here is the discontinuity of
the optimal haircut in the region [0; L], which stems from the xed default cost  > 0.
Finally, at B000 , there is a unique equilibrium DE
00 at the upper corner for haircuts  = 1
such that BDE
00
= [q (1  )] 1B000 .6
6This equilibrium is at the upper corner just for purposes of demonstration. There may also be unique
default equilibria at an interior solution.
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Figure 1: Equilibria across initial debt
Note: The market nancing, minimum haircut and optimal haircut schedules are respectively given by
(11), (8) and Table 1.
In the next section, we describe the changes in these equilibrium allocations as a result
of interventions that alter the seniority structure of sovereign debt.
3 The e¤ect of tranching when senior debt is riskless
In this section, we reconsider the model equilibrium by allowing for a share 0  !  1 of
government bonds to have senior status. To begin with, we nd it convenient to assume that
the senior tranche is free of default risk and priced on par with risk-free assets at qs = q.
This is equivalent to positing prohibitively high costs of defaulting on senior bonds. We will
drop the assumption of non-defaultability in Section 4.
For a given share of senior debt, junior bonds are traded at the price qb reecting expected
returns as per the debt pricing condition (10). The market nancing schedule can then be
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written as
B = B0 [!q + (1  !) qb] 1 (16)
=
B0
q (1   (1  !) )
where  is the haircut on junior bonds. The governments period 2 budget constraint and
default condition (for junior bonds) become, respectively
T  G = [! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )]B (17)
z (G+B) > z (T ) +  +  (1  !) B (18)
in reection of full repayment of senior bonds.
In an interior solution, the discretionary government internalizes only the budgetary cost
 of a marginal increase in the haircut on junior bonds. This leaves the trade-o¤ between
tax distortions and default costs same as in Section 2.1 with (5) determining the primary
surplus

T^  G

independently of the senior tranche size !. A key implication is that, in the
absence of a rise in the primary surplus, tranching leads to the re-allocation of repayments
from junior to senior bondholders. To avoid default on the senior tranche, the government
haircuts bonds in the junior tranche by
^ =
1
(1  !) (1  )
 
1  T^  G
B
!
(19)
which is increasing in !.
Note also that tranching reduces the revenues gained from default at a given haircut.
With a xed default cost  > 0, this increases the minimum haircut  required to make
(interior) default optimal.  is implicitly dened by the expression
z

T^

+  = z

T^ +
(1  !) (1  ) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

(20)
   (1  !) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

and positively related to ! while remaining independent of B.
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For ^ < , the optimal policy plan is free of default and remains identical to the case
without tranching. For ^ > 1 and
z (G+B) > z (G+ (! + (1  !))B) +  +  (1  !)B (21)
the optimal policy plan involves complete default  = 1 on junior bonds. In this case, tax
revenues are given by the expression
T = G+ [! + (1  !)]B
and naturally increasing in the share of senior bonds !, which must still be repaid in full.
Finally, Table 2 summarizes the revised optimal policy plan under tranching, where the rst
two columns describe the governments optimal haircut schedule for junior bonds
Table 2: Governments optimal plan under tranching
If ^ > 1, z (G+B) > z (G+ (! + (1  !))B) :  = 1 T = G+ [! + (1  !)]B
++  (1  !)B
If ^ 2 [; 1] :  = ^ T = T^ = z0 1   
1 

Otherwise :  = 0 T = G+B
Observe that, on the one hand, tranching moves the optimal haircut towards complete
default on junior bonds (i.e. the upper corner solution with  = 1) since both the interior
and minimum haircut expressions

^; 

increase in !. On the other hand, with su¢ ciently
high !, the default condition in the upper corner given by (21) is not satised such that
tranching may eliminate default.7 Elaborating on these two e¤ects, in the rest of the section
we will analyze whether and under what conditions tranching sovereign debt may prevent
debt crises. A full description of equilibria under tranching is provided in the Appendix B.
3.1 A Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result
We start by establishing that, as long as the optimal haircut lies in the interior region,
tranching changes neither the equilibrium boundaries (in terms of government nancing
7See Appendix A.2 for a formal proof that  is positively related to ! and Appendix A.3 for a proof that
su¢ ciently high ! eliminates default.
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needs B0) nor the governments debt bill B. This stems from our earlier nding that the
government optimally increases the haircut on junior bonds to fully repay the senior tranche.
In anticipation of a lower expected return, investors discount junior bond prices qb which,
under risk neutrality, exactly o¤sets the move to a risk-free price q in the senior tranche.
Proposition 2 Let ! denote the minimum senior tranche size that leads to a corner solution
in the default equilibrium (DE) such that
! 
(1  )

T^  G

  B0
q
(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G
 2 [0; 1) (22)
@!
@B0
< 0
For all ! < !, we can write
TDE = T^
DE =
1
1  !
B0
q
 

T^  G

(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G
 < 1
@DE
@!
>
@
@!
> 0 8 B0 > B0
@BDE
@!
=
@ B0
@!
=
@B0
@!
= 0
where
 
BDE; ; B0; B0

are respectively given by (15), (20), (13) and (14).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This nding is naturally interpreted in light of Modigliani and Miller (1958)s irrelevance
result. Without a change in total payments to bondholders, tranching is irrelevant under
risk neutrality. In other words, the price of bond, !q + (1  !) qb; and the debt bill B are
independent of ! such that tranching has no impact on government incentives to default.
Constancy of the marginal (budgetary) default cost  and hence the (interior) primary
surplus

T^  G

are crucial for this result; were  to increase (decrease) in , tranching
would lead to a rise (fall) in the primary surplus and lower (higher) government borrowing
costs and incentives to default.
15
Figure 2: Tranching at an interior equilibrium
Note: The market nancing, minimum haircut and optimal haircut schedules are respectively given by
(16), (20) and Table 2. The market nancing schedule reects the total debt bill while the minimum
haircut and the optimal haircut schedule pertain to junior bonds.
We use Figure 2 to provide further intuition. At senior tranche size !, the market
nancing and optimal haircut schedules intersect twice, leading to multiple equilibria. First,
there is a no default equilibrium (NDE) with no haircut on public debt and bonds issued at
the risk-free price BNDE = B0=q. Second, there is a default equilibrium (DE) with a haircut
DE on junior bonds. In this equilibrium, the anticipation of default leads to a reduction in
junior bond prices and a higher debt bill BDE.
Increasing the size of the senior tranche to !0 > ! has three distinct e¤ects. First, it
pivots the market nancing schedule B (; B0; !) leftward. Provided that investors anticipate
a default, senior bonds are sold at a higher price q > qb than junior bonds. Therefore, issuing
a greater share of its debt in a senior tranche reduces the governments total debt bill B at
a given haircut for junior bonds. Second, it increases the minimum haircut from  to 0.
A rise in the share of senior bonds reduces the default base from which the government
may extract resources through default. This necessitates a larger haircut to make default
16
optimal given a xed default cost . Third, it causes an upward shift in the optimal haircut
schedule  (B;!) within the interior region. Since the primary surplus remains constant in
an interior solution, the government increases the haircut on junior bonds in order to fully
repay a larger share of senior bonds.
NDE naturally remains unchanged in response to the rise in ! as there is no distinction
between senior and junior tranches without default risk. In contrast, the default equilibrium
moves from DE to DE 0 due to the rst and third e¤ects. As explained above, the haircut
on junior bonds rises from DE to a level DE0 that exactly o¤sets any movements in the
governments debt bill BDE. Moreover, Proposition 2 indicates that DE rises by a greater
amount than the minimum haircut . Therefore, equilibrium boundaries are not a¤ected
and tranching is ine¤ective at eliminating debt crises.
3.2 Non-neutrality
The irrelevance result above is conditional on an interior solution DE < 1. We now show
that our version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails when default rates on junior bonds
are at the corner, that is, default is complete.
In Figure 2, an increase in the share of senior debt ! drives the optimal haircut towards
the upper corner. Proposition 2 establishes that there is a threshold ! such that, for any share
of the senior debt in excess of it, DE has a corner solution with DE = 1. We now show that,
at the corner solution, the ndings for the interior case are reversed: increasing ! reduces the
governments borrowing costs and the total debt bill B, and eventually eliminates default.
These ndings are formally stated by Proposition 3 below. This proposition also shows that
the minimum senior tranche share ! 2 (!; 1) required to eliminate default increases in the
governments nancing need B0.
Proposition 3 For ! > !, the default equilibrium has a corner solution characterized by
DE = 1
TDE = G+ (! + (1  !))BDE
BDE =
B0
q (1   (1  !))
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such that
@TDE
@!
> 0
@BDE
@!
< 0
There exists a minimum senior tranche ! above which there is no default, implicitly dened
by the expression
z

G+
1
1   (1  !)
B0
q

= z

G+
! + (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q

(23)
++
(1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q
such that
! < ! < 1
@!
@B0
> 0
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The key insight here is that the government may not respond to tranching by increasing
the haircut on junior bonds when it is already at the upper corner. Instead, it is driven to
increase tax revenues in order to fully repay the senior tranche. Since tranching leads to a
rise in total payments to bondholders, the ine¤ectiveness result from Modigliani and Miller
(1958) no longer holds.
There are two distinct channels through which tranching a¤ects the governments default
decision. First, without a rise in the haircut, junior bond prices qb remain constant in
response to an increase in !. As bonds in the senior tranche trade at a higher price q > qb,
tranching reduces the governments average borrowing costs
 
!q + (1  !) qb 1 and total
debt bill B. Consequently, tax revenues T = G + B required to avoid default and the
associated tax distortions decrease.
Second, with higher tax revenues needed to repay senior bonds during default, tax distor-
tions z (G+ (! + (1  !))B) under default increase with a rise in !. Together, these two
channel decrease the potential reduction in tax distortions by defaulting on public debt and
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Figure 3: Tranching to eliminate default
Note: The market nancing, minimum haircut and optimal haircut schedules are respectively given by
(16), (20) and Table 2. The market nancing schedule reects the total debt bill while the minimum
haircut and the optimal haircut schedule pertain to junior bonds.
therefore the governments temptation to do so. Given the xed cost of default, a su¢ ciently
large senior tranche then prevents default.
Finally, we use Figure 3 to contrast the e¤ects of tranching in a corner solution with the
interior case shown in Figure 2. The baseline scenario with multiple equilibria (NDE;DE)
is identical in the two gures but !00 in Figure 3 is su¢ ciently large to move the minimum
haircut  to the upper corner. Consequently, the optimal haircut schedule  (B0; !) loses
its interior region and jumps directly from no default to a complete haircut at a boundary
determined by (21). An increase in ! moves the default boundary to the right while the
market nancing scheduleB (;B0; !) pivots leftward as in Figure 2. When the senior tranche
is large enough, the market nancing and optimal haircut schedules no longer intersect above
 = 0, and the default equilibrium DE is eliminated.
Note that, as before, NDE is not a¤ected by tranching since seniority is irrelevant in the
absence of default risk. Indeed, when tranching is successful in ruling out debt crises, the
prospect of a complete haircut on junior bonds remains completely o¤-equilibrium and both
junior and senior bonds are priced at risk free level qb = q.
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4 Risky senior debt
In this section, we move away from the extreme assumption that the senior tranche is non-
defaultable. We show that our main results generalize to the plausible case in which, even if
the costs of defaulting on senior bonds are larger than for junior bonds, the government may
(choose to) default also on senior bonds The governments budget constraint and market
nancing schedule now are:
T  G = [! (1  (1  ) s) + (1  !)]B
B =
B0
q [1   + ! (1  s)] (24)
where s denotes the haircut on the senior tranche, and the prices of senior and junior bonds
are respectively given by
qs = q (1  s)
qb = q (1  )
In an interior solution, the haircut on the senior tranche is determined by the expression
^s =
1
! (1  )
 
! +  (1  !)  T^  G
B
!
(25)
with taxes T^ pinned down by the same rst order condition (5) as before. Similarly, in a
corner solution with complete default on both tranches (s =  = 1), taxes are given by
T = G+ B
Proposition 4 describes a senior default equilibrium (SDE) where the government
optimally defaults on both tranches.
Proposition 4 Let SDE denote an equilibrium where the government defaults on the senior
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tranche. SDE is characterized by
SDEs = min
24 1
!
(! +  (1  !)) B0
q
  (1   (1  !))

T^  G

(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G
 ; 1
35
SDE = 1
BSDE =
8<:
B0
q(1 ) if 
SDE
s = 1
(1 )B0
q
 (T^ G)
1   otherwise
T SDE =
(
G+ BSDE if SDEs = 1
T^ otherwise
and self-conrming for all ! > ! where ! is implicitly dened by the expression
z
 
G+ (! + (1  !))BSDE = z  T SDE+ s + !SDEs BSDE
such that
@!
@s
> 0
@!
@B0
< 0
For su¢ ciently high s, the set ! 2 (!; !) is non-empty.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
According to Proposition 4, governments funding costs and taxes are equivalent between
SDE and the default equilibrium DE
BSDE = BDE
T SDE = TDE
Once the government defaults on the senior tranche, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result
described in Section 3.1 holds. The government has no incentive to raise tax revenues and
average funding costs remain constant regardless of how revenues are allocated between the
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two tranches. Therefore, tranching is ine¤ective not only when the senior tranche size falls
short of ! (and there is an interior haircut on the junior tranche) but also when it exceeds
! leading to default on the senior tranche.
The key implication is that tranching requires higher xed default costs on the senior
tranche to generate commitment to repay. The last part of Proposition 4 indicates that, for
su¢ ciently high s, there exists an intermediate region of senior tranche size ! 2 (!; !)
where tranching eliminates default. Since ! > !, the junior tranche is haircut fully in this
region. Provideds is high enough, however, the government chooses to increase tax revenues
rather than defaulting on the senior tranche. The resulting decrease in the governments ex-
ante funding costs then eliminate default. Since ! is increasing in B0 while ! decreases in it,
greater government nancing needs require higher levels of s for tranching to be e¤ective.
5 A numerical illustration
In this section, we provide a numerical example to demonstrate debt crises in the model
economy and the circumstances under which tranching may eliminate these crises.
We adopt the following calibration for the numerical example. For tax distortions, we
use the functional form zi (Ti) =  iT
2
i such that tax revenues in the interior solutions are
given by T^i =  [2 i (1  )] 1. We set  H to an arbitrarily small value in line with ruling
out default in state H and calibrate  L >  H to attain a primary surplus of T^L  G = 0:40
(where G = 0 without loss of generality). Expected output
E [Y ] = (1  )YH + YL
is normalized to unity such that the primary surplus can be interpreted as 40% of expected
GDP. The xed and budgetary costs of default are calibrated to  =  = 0:10 amounting to
10% of expected GDP each when B0 = 1 (we consider di¤erent calibrations for s below).
Given the two-period structure of our model, these gures are in terms of present discounted
values. Finally, q is set to 0:99 consistent with a risk-free interest rate of 1% and we also set
 = 0:10 in line with the regularity conditions in Section 2.3.
Figure 4 depicts the equilibria without tranching (! = 0). Panel 1 shows the evolution
of haircuts L (on the y-axis) against the governments initial nancing needs B0 (on the
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Figure 4: Equilibria without tranching
x-axis). The shaded areas display the regions with multiple equilibria. Equilibrium regions
are monotonic in B0; from left to right, we have a unique NDE, multiplicity between NDE
and DE, and a unique DE.
Due to the xed default costs  > 0, the haircut in state L rises discretely to a minimum
haircut  = 0:76 as the equilibrium switches fromNDE toDE. In the range of B0 displayed,
the haircut remains in the interior region and therefore continues to rise with B0. Panel 2
shows that discrete changes in haircuts also cause jumps in the governments debt bill B. It
also indicates that, under our calibration, sovereign spreads over the risk-free rate are around
10% in DE.
Figure 5 plots the relevant threshold values for the senior tranche size ! (on the y-axis)
across B0. In Panel 1, ! depicts the minimum tranche size required to take the haircut to the
upper corner. For ! < !L, tranching is completely ine¤ective as per the Modigliani-Miller
ine¤ectiveness result and only serves to re-allocate payments from the junior to the senior
tranche. The schedule !shows the minimum senior tranche size required to prevent default,
thus ruling out DE.
Observe that as B0 rises, ! decreases while ! increases. Therefore, at high levels of B0,
smaller tranche sizes may have an e¤ect while eliminating default require as very large senior
tranche. Eliminating the bad equilibrium in multiplicity regions, however, only requires a
senior tranche size of approximately 50%.
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Figure 5: Tranching
Finally, Panel 2 plots the threshold ! above which there is default on the senior tranche
at di¤erent levels of s, the additional xed default cost for doing so. At s = 0, there is
no intermediate region between ! and ! where tranching may have an e¤ect. We show that
as s rises, however, ! shifts up and senior tranche sizes may get large to prevent default at
increasingly higher values of B0.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ects of tranching on sovereign risk in a standard model of debt
crises with risk neutral creditors, costly default and a government that faces a trade-o¤ be-
tween distortionary taxation and applying an (optimal) haircut to bondholders. Introducing
tranching into the model yields two important insights. First, default costs on senior bonds
may transpire into commitment to repay both the senior and junior tranches. Second, the
e¤ect of tranching on resilience to debt crises is highly non-linear in the senior tranche size.
We found that tranching only redistributes government revenues from junior to senior
bondholders unless default costs are higher for senior than for junior bonds, and the senior
tranche size is su¢ ciently but not too large. We characterize a lower and an upper threshold
for this tranche that denes the region over which the seniority structure is not neutral.
Remarkably, in this intermediate region, tranching reduces vulnerability to debt crises.
24
This is because, without any remaining funds to redistribute from the junior tranche, the
government is forced to raise tax revenues to pay the senior tranche. This results in an
increase in total payments to bondholders, which in turn leads to a fall in government bor-
rowing costs given default expectations. Borrowing costs may then fall enough to eliminate
the default equilibrium altogether.
We should stress in conclusion that our results can be applied more broadly. The mecha-
nisms considered here are relevant for any situation in which there are xed costs associated
with default, and agents may take costly but non-contractible actions to increase recovery
rates. Therefore, there may be a role for tranching corporate debt in sectors with signicant
moral hazard.
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7 Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions and Lemmata
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
No default equilibrium (NDE) To begin with, consider an equilibrium with no default
in any state such that NDE = 0. Then the interest parity condition (10) indicates that
qNDEb = q
BNDE =
B0
q
and (4) gives us the following condition for the absence of default to be conrmed in equi-
librium
^
NDE
=
1
1    
T^  G
1  
q
BNDE
< 
We can re-arrange to write this in terms of government debt
BNDE <
T^  G
1   (1  )
which in terms of initial nancing need becomes
B0 <
q

T^  G

1   (1  ) (26)
Using (3), a su¢ cient condition for NDE to be self-conrming is
B0 < B0 
q

T^  G

1   (1  )
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Default equilibrium (DE) Now consider an equilibrium with default in state L such that
 2 [; 1]. In an interior solution  = ^ 2 [; 1), we will have
^
DE
=
1
1    
T^  G
(1  )BDE
qDEb = q
"
1  
1  
 
1  T^  G
BDE
!#
In terms of initial nancing needs, the equilibrium is then characterized as
^
DE
=
B0  

T^  G

q
(1  )B0   

T^  G

q
qDEb =
(1    )B0q
(1  )B0   

T^  G

q
BDE =
(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

1    
There are three conditions for this interior equilibrium to exist:
^
DE
>  $ BDE > T^  G
1  (1  ) 
^
DE
< 1$ BDE < T^  G

and in terms of nancing needs, they become
B0  B0 
1  
1  (1  ) q

T^  G

B0  1  

q

T^  G

Secondly, there is a corner solution with DE+ = 1. In this equilibrium, government
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bonds are priced at
qDE+b = q (1  )
BDE+b =
B0
q (1  )
and the equilibrium condition is
^
DE+  1$ BDE+  T^  G

which in terms of nancing needs become
B0  1  

q

T^  G

With continuity between interior and corner equilibria, the boundary above with DE is
self-conrming is given by
^
DE  
or in terms of nancing needs
B0  B0
Coexistence of equilibria NDE and DE equilibria coexist when nancing needs fall in
the range
B0  B0 < B0
) 1  
1  (1  ) 

T^  G

 B0
q
<
T^  G
1  (1  ) 
This is non-empty under the condition
1  
1  (1  ) 

T^  G

<
T^  G
1  (1  ) 
)  > 0
30
which will be satised when there is a strictly positive xed cost of default  > 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The solution for the interior case of DE is provided in Appendix B. Using this solution,
(32a) indicates that
@BDE
@!
= 0
as long as ! remains at a level that does not lead to a corner solution DE = 1. Using (31),
we can also show that
@DE
@!
=
1
(1  ) (1  !)2
 
1  T^  G
B
!
(27)
=
DE
1  ! > 0
To determine how ! a¤ects the minimum haircut, let
f (!; )  z

T^ +
(1  !) (1  ) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

  z

T^i

  
   (1  !) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

such that (20) indicates f (!; ) = 0. Since T^ is independent of ! and
@

(1 !)
!+(1 !)(1 (1 ))

@!
=
 
[! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )]2 < 0 (28)
we can show that
@f (!; )
@!
=
i

T^  G

(1  )
[! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )]2


1     z
0

T^ +
(1  !) (1  ) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

This is negative under the condition

1   < z
0

T^ +
(1  !) (1  ) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

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which must be satised since z0

T^

= 
1  by virtue of the interior FOC and z
00 (:) > 0.
Moreover, using (28), we can also write
@f (!; )
@
=
(1  !) (1  )

T^  G

[! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )]2

z0i

T^ +
(1  !) (1  ) 
! + (1  !) (1  (1  ) )

T^  G

  
1  

> 0
Through the implicit function theorem, we can deduce that
@f (!; )
@!
+
@
@!
@f (!; )
@
= 0
) @
@!
=  
@f(!;)
@!
@f(!;)
@^
=

1  ! > 0 (29)
for all (!; ) within the unit circle. Using (29), we can then write
@^
@!
>
@
@!
8 ^ > 
Finally, to show that the boundaries
 
B0; B0

are independent of !, let
g (!;B)  z (G+B)  z (T )     (1  !) B
where (18) indicates that g (!;B) = 0 at a boundary. This yields the derivatives
@g (!;B)
@!
=
@B
@!
z0 (G+B)  @Ti
@!
z0 (T )  @ ((1  !) B)
@!
@g (!;B)
@B
= z0 (G+B)  @T
@B
z0 (T )  @ ((1  !) B)
@B
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In an interior solution, we know that
@B
@!
= 0
@T
@!
=
@T
@B
= 0
@ ((1  !) B)
@!
= 0
@ ((1  !) B)
@B
=
1
1  
Combining these with the derivatives above indicates
@g (!;B)
@!
= 0
@g (!;B)
@B
= z0 (G+B)  
1  a > 0
and by the implicit function theorem we have that, on a boundary
 
B0; B
0

@B
@!
=  
@f(!;B)
B
@f(!;B)
!
= 0
Since, B is a positive function of B0 and independent of ! in an interior solution, we can
further write
@B0
@!
=
@ B0
@!
= 0
In other words, ! has no e¤ect on the equilibrium boundaries when the haircut falls short
of an upper corner DE = 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
BDE is given by (33) and combining this with the corner default condition (21) yields the
implicit expression (23) for !. It follows from Proposition 1 that ! > !. To show that
! < 1, we simply set ! = 1 in the default condition (21). In this case, not defaulting is
leads to strictly higher welfare for any xed default cost
 > 0
33
which shows that ! < 1 since reducing the size of the senior tranche by an arbitrarily small
amount would still lead to no default.
Finally, to show that ! is increasing in B0, let
f (!;B0)  z

G+
B0
q (1   (1  !))

  z

G+
! + (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q

    (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q
such that f (!; B0) = 0. This leads to the derivatives
@f (!;D)
@!
=
B0
q
h
  z0

G+ 1
1 (1 !)
B0
q

  (1    ) z0

G+ !+(1 !)
1 (1 !)
B0
q
i
(1   (1  !))2 ;
@f (!;D)
@B0
=
z0

G+ 1
1 (1 !)
B0
q

  (! + (1  !)) z0

G+ !+(1 !)
1 (1 !)
B0
q

   (1  !)
q (1   (1  !))
Since  < 1, a su¢ cient condition for @f(!;D)
@!
< 0 and @f(!;D)
@B0
> 0 is
z0

G+
! + (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q

>

1  
which must be true since
z0

G+
! + (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q

> z

T^

=

1  
Therefore, using the implicit function theorem and f (!; B0) = 0, we can write
@!
@B0
=  
@f(!;D)
@B0
@f(!;D)
@!
> 0
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
To begin with, consider the interior equilibrium. Combining (24) with (25) yields
BSDE =
(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

1    
SDEs =
1
!
(! +  (1  !)) B0
q
  (1   (1  !))

T^  G

(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

where taxes T^ are pinned down by (5). The interior equilibrium is valid under the condition
B0
q
>
1  


T^  G

Otherwise, the equilibrium is at the corner SDEs = 1 with debt and taxes given by
BSDE =
B0
q (1  )
T SDE = G+ BSDE
The default condition can be written as
z
 
G+ (! + (1  !))BSDE > z  T SDE+ s + !SDEs BSDE
which in an interior equilibrium becomes
z

T^ + (1  )x (!;B0)

> z

T^

+ s + x (!;B0)
where
x (!;B0) 
(! + (1  !)) B0
q
  (1   (1  !))

T^  G

1    
To analyze the properties of ! let
f (B0;s; !)  z

T^ + (1  )x (!;B0)

  s   z

T^

  x (!;B0) (30)
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such that f (B0;s; !) = 0. We can then write the derivatives
@f (!;B0)
@!
= (1  ) z0

T^ + (1  )x (!;B0)
 @x (!;B0)
@!
  @x (!;B0)
@!
@f (!;B0)
@B0
= (1  ) z0

T^ + (1  )x (!;B0)
 @x (!;B0)
@B0
  @x (!;B0)
@B0
@f (!;B0)
@s
=  1 < 0
Using
@x (!;B0)
@!
=

(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

x (!;B0)
(! + (1  !)) B0
q
  (1   (1  !))

T^  G

@x (!;B0)
@B0
=
! + (1  !)
1    
it is straightforward to show that we will have
@x (!;B0)
@!
> 0 ,
@x (!;B0)
@B0
> 0
under the regularity condition 1  > . The derivatives of f (!;B0) with respect to (!;B0)
will then also be positive under the condition
z0

T^ + (1  )x (!;B0)

>

1  
which must be true since
z0

T^

=

1   , z
00 (:) > 0
Using the implicit function theorem, we can then write
@!
@s
> 0
@!
@B0
< 0
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Note also that using (30) and (22) , we can also show that
f (B0;s; !) =  s
which indicates that we will have ! > ! for any s > 0.
Finally, we conduct the same analysis for the corner solution, in which case the default
condition is
z

G+
! + (1  !)
1  
B0
q

> z

G+

1  
B0
q

+ s
+
!
1  
B0
q
We can then write
f (B0;s; !)  z

G+
! + (1  !)
1  
B0
q

  s   !
1  
B0
q
 z

G+

1  
B0
q

such that f (B0;s; !) = 0 and
@f (!;B0)
@!
=

(1  ) z0

G+
! + (1  !)
1  
B0
q

  

B0
(1  ) q > 0
@f (!;B0)
@B0
=
0@ (! + (1  !)) z0 G+ !+(1 !)1  B0q   !
 z0

G+ 
1 
B0
q
 1A 1
(1  ) q > 0
@f (!;B0)
@s
=  1 < 0
As with the interior case, under the implicit function theorem this implies
@!
@s
> 0
@!
@B0
< 0
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Moreover, we can write ! > ! for all s > 0 since
f (B0;s; !) =  s
where ! = 0 must be true since we are at the corner equilibrium already at the boundary
where SDE becomes self-conrming.
B Equilibria under tranching
No default equilibrium (NDE)
Tranching does not change anything in the no default equilibrium as both senior and junior
bonds are repaid fully. The equilibrium is characterized by
 = 0
qNDEb = q
BNDE =
B0
q
TNDE = G+
B0
q
but the condition for this equilibrium to be self-conrming depends on !. It follows from
Proposition 2 that senior tranches below the size
!  !NDE  1
1  
 
T^  G
B0=q
  
!
leave the condition to conrm the equilibrium identical to the case without tranching de-
scribed in Proposition 1. For !  !NDE, any deviation to default is at a corner solution and
the relevant condition to conrm NDE is B0  B0 (!) where B0 is implicitly dened as a
function of ! by the expression
z

G+
B0
q

= z

G+ (! + (1  !))
B0
q

+ +  (1  !)
B0
q
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such that
@ B0
@!
> 0 8 ! 2  !NDE; 1
B.1 Default equilibrium (DE)
We begin with the interior case, where DE is characterized by the set of expressions
DE = ^
DE
=
1
(1  ) (1  !)
 
1  T^  G
BDE
!
qDEb = q
"
1  
(1  ) (1  !)
 
1  T^  G
BDE
!#
BDE =
B0
!q + (1  !) qDEb
TDE = T^
which in terms of initial nancing needs become
^
DE
=
1
1  !
B0
q
 

T^  G

(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G
 (31)
qDEb =
q
1  !
((1  ) (1  !)  ) B0
q
+ !

T^  G

(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

TDE = T^
Observe that tax revenues in the defaulting state are not a¤ected by !. Instead, the govern-
ment increases the haircuts on junior bonds to fully pay the senior tranche and junior bond
prices qDEb decline in anticipation of a higher haircut. Under risk neutrality, the decline in
qDEb exactly o¤sets the higher prices for the senior tranche such that the governments total
debt bill remains unchanged compared to the case without tranching
BDE =
B0
!q + (1  !) qDEb
=
(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

1     (32a)
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This interior case is valid when the size of the senior tranche remains below
!  ! 
(1  )

T^  G

  B0
q
(1  ) B0
q
  

T^  G

In this case, the condition for DE to be self-conrming remains identical to the case without
tranching described in Proposition 1
When ! > !, on the other hand, DE is characterized by the (upper) corner case such
that
DE+ = 1
qDE+b = q (1  )
BDE+ =
B0
!q + (1  !) qDE+b
TDE+ = G+
! + (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q
Since the government is unable to increase the haircut on junior bonds further, a rise in
! leads to a rise in tax revenues collected during default. Moreover, as the junior bond
prices remain xed at qDE+b < qb in the corner solution, further increases in ! reduce the
governments borrowing costs. Therefore, the debt bill BDE+ decreases in ! as per the
expression
BDE+ =
B0
q
[1   (1  !)] 1 (33)
Finally, DE is self-conrming in the range of nancing need B0  B0 where B0 is im-
plicitly by the expression
z

G+
1
1   (1  !)
B0
q

= z

G+
! + (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q

(34)
++
 (1  !)
1   (1  !)
B0
q
such that
@B0
@!
> 0 8 ! 2 (!; 1)
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Note that we can equivalently let (34) dene a minimum senior tranche ! that eliminates
DE. In this case, ! > ! would be increasing in B0 but remain strictly below 1 at any given
B0.
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